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Abstract—This paper describes Slither, a static analysis frame-
work designed to provide rich information about Ethereum smart
contracts. It works by converting Solidity smart contracts into
an intermediate representation called SlithIR. SlithIR uses Static
Single Assignment (SSA) form and a reduced instruction set
to ease implementation of analyses while preserving semantic
information that would be lost in transforming Solidity to
bytecode. Slither allows for the application of commonly used
program analysis techniques like dataflow and taint tracking.
Our framework has four main use cases: (1) automated detection
of vulnerabilities, (2) automated detection of code optimization
opportunities, (3) improvement of the user’s understanding of
the contracts, and (4) assistance with code review.
In this paper, we present an overview of Slither, detail
the design of its intermediate representation, and evaluate its
capabilities on real-world contracts. We show that Slither’s bug
detection is fast, accurate, and outperforms other static analysis
tools at finding issues in Ethereum smart contracts in terms of
speed, robustness, and balance of detection and false positives.
We compared tools using a large dataset of smart contracts and
manually reviewed results for 1000 of the most used contracts.
I. INTRODUCTION
A growing number of industries are using blockchain plat-
forms to perform trustless computation using smart contracts.
Applications ranging from financial services to supply chains,
and from logistics to healthcare are being developed to rely on
blockchain technologies. One of the most popular underlying
technologies is the Ethereum smart contact. These contracts
are typically written in a high-level programming language
called Solidity, then compiled to Ethereum Virtual Machine
(EVM) assembly instructions for blockchain deployment. Of-
ten, the deployed smart contract’s code is insecure: software
vulnerabilities are regularly identified, and have been exploited
by malicious actors, resulting in millions of dollars in damages
and harm to the reputation of blockchain systems.
In the last few years, a variety of tools and frameworks to
analyze and find vulnerabilities in Ethereum smart contracts
were developed based on static and dynamic analysis. These
tools are based on popular program testing techniques such as
fuzzing, symbolic execution, taint tracking, and static analysis.
Static analysis is one of the most effective ways to detect
potential issues in contracts. Typically, static analysis tools
work by analyzing the Solidity source code or a disassembled
version of the compiled contract. Then, they transform the
contract code into an internal representation, more suitable
for the analysis and detection of common security issues.
While modern compilers, such as clang, offer various APIs
on top of which third-party analyzers can be built, the Solidity
compiler fails to offer the same features. Ideally, a static
analysis framework for Ethereum smart contracts should have
the following properties:
1) Correct level of abstraction: if the framework is too
abstract, it can be hard to introduce accurate semantics
that capture common usage patterns. Conversely, if the
framework is too narrowly focused on the detection
of certain issues only, it can be difficult to add new
detectors or analyses.
2) Robustness: it should parse and analyze real-world code
without crashing.
3) Performance: analysis should be fast, even for large
contracts, so as to integrate easily into development tools
like IDEs, or into continuous integration checks that run
at every commit.
4) Accuracy: it should allow for the development of de-
tectors that find most potential issues while maintaining
a low false positive rate. If the number of false positives
is very high, it can require a manual audit of the entire
contract, defeating its utility.
5) Batteries included: it should include a set of common
analyses and issue detectors that are useful for most
contracts. This will appeal both to security engineers
looking to extend the framework and to code auditors
looking for issues to report.
This paper introduces Slither, an open-source static anal-
ysis framework. Our tool provides rich information about
Ethereum smart contracts and has the critical properties enu-
merated above. Slither uses its own intermediate representa-
tion, SlithIR, designed to make static analyses on Solidity
code straightforward. It applies widely used program analysis
techniques such as dataflow and taint tracking to extract and
refine information. While Slither is built as a security-oriented
static analysis framework, it is also used to enhance the user’s
understanding of smart contracts, assist in code reviews, and
detect missing optimizations.
We summarize our contribution as follows:
• We present Slither, a framework for static analysis of
ar
X
iv
:1
90
8.
09
87
8v
1 
 [c
s.S
E]
  2
6 A
ug
 20
19
Solidity contracts.
• We detail the design of Slither’s intermediate representa-
tion and analyzers.
• We evaluate and compare the performance, robustness,
and accuracy of Slither on a large set of actively used
smart contracts.
Both Slither and our dataset are open source, so that others
can validate and improve on our results. The rest of the
paper is organized as follows. Section II presents related work.
Section III introduces a high-level overview of Slither’s archi-
tecture, and Section IV details the intermediate representation
language SlithIR. In Section V, we explain how we performed
an evaluation and comparison of Slither against state-of-the-art
tools and discuss the results. Finally, Section VI summarizes
the paper and discusses future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Several frameworks have been created to allow users and
security researchers to analyze Ethereum smart contracts and
detect potential issues. They are based either on static or
dynamic analysis.
A. Static Analysis
These tools rely on the analysis of the code without exe-
cuting it to detect issues in the smart contract. Securify is one
of these tools [27], developed by the SRI Systems Lab (ETH
Zurich). It works at the bytecode level: first, it parses and
decompiles the EVM bytecode, then it translates the resulting
code to semantic facts using static analysis. Finally, it matches
the facts with a list of predefined patterns to detect common
issues. Securify is open-source. It was implemented using Java
and stratified Datalog. SmartCheck is another static analysis
tool [20], developed by SmartDec. It works by translating
directly from the Solidity source code into an XML-based
intermediate representation. It then checks the intermediate
representation against XPath patterns to identify potential
security, functional, operational, and development issues. It
is also implemented using Java. Solhint is a tool for linting
Solidity code [18], developed by ProtoFire. It aims to provide
both security and style guide validations. It is open-source and
it is implemented in NodeJS using the SolidityJ parser [2].
Other notable static analysis frameworks include Vandal [4]
and EtherTrust [10].
GASPER [5] and GasReduce [6] use static analysis to detect
potential optimizations in contracts, GASPER at a high-level
(e.g. dead code) and GasReduce at the bytecode instruction
pattern level. Both focus on dead code and loop optimizations,
rather than, e.g., the could-be-declared-constant optimization
we discuss below, so these approaches are largely orthogonal
to Slither’s optimization patterns.
B. Dynamic Analysis
These tools rely on execution of the contract, leveraging
symbolic execution, taint tracking, and fuzzing to discover
vulnerabilities. Oyente was one of the first [14] tools for
analysis and detection of security issues in Ethereum smart
contracts. It is developed by Melonport and its code is open-
sourced [17]. Manticore is an open-source symbolic execution
tool for analysis of Ethereum smart contracts and binaries
created by Trail of Bits [24]. Echidna [25], another product
of Trail of Bits, is a property-based testing tool designed
for fuzzing Ethereum smart contracts. Mythril Classic is an
open-source security analysis tool for Ethereum smart con-
tracts created by ConsenSys [7]. It uses concolic analysis,
taint analysis, and control flow checking to detect a variety
of security vulnerabilities. Finally, TeEther is an automatic
exploit generation tool for certain types of vulnerabilities in
Ethereum smart contracts created by Krupp and Rossow [13].
Its source code is not available at the time of this writing, but
its authors promised to make their tool open-source 90 days
after its presentation at Usenix 2018.
III. SLITHER
Slither is a static analysis framework designed to provide
granular information about smart contract code and the flexi-
bility necessary to support many applications. The framework
is currently used for the following:
• Automated vulnerability detection: a large variety of
smart contract bugs can be detected without user inter-
vention.
• Automated optimization detection: Slither detects code
optimizations that the compiler misses [5].
• Code understanding: printers summarize and display
contracts’ information to aid in the study of the codebase.
• Assisted code review: through its API, a user can interact
with Slither.
Slither analyzes contracts using static analysis in a multi-
stage procedure. Slither takes as initial input the Solidity
Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) generated by the Solidity compiler
from the contract source code. In the first stage, Slither recov-
ers important information such as the contract’s inheritance
graph, the control flow graph (CFG), and the list of expres-
sions. Next, Slither transforms the entire code of the contract
to SlithIR, its internal representation language. SlithIR uses
static single assessment (SSA) to facilitate the computation of
a variety of code analyses. During the third stage, actual code
analysis, Slither computes a set of pre-defined analyses that
provide enhanced information to the other modules. Figure 1
summarizes all these stages.
A. Built-in Code Analyses
• Read/Write
Slither identifies the reads and the writes of variables. For
each contract, function, or node of the control flow graph,
it is possible to retrieve the variables read or written, and
filter by the type of variables (local or state). For example,
it is possible to know the state variables written from a
specific function, or find which functions write to a given
variable. Several detectors are based on this information,
such as those for uninitialized variables and reentrancy.
• Protected functions A recurrent pattern in smart con-
tract design is the use of ownership to protect access
Fig. 1: Slither overview
to functions. The thinking behind this pattern is that
a specific user (or set of users), called the owner(s),
can perform privileged operations. For instance, only an
owner can mint new tokens. Modeling the protection of
functions lowers the number of false positives. In order
to detect unprotected functions, Slither checks for cases
where (1) the function is not the constructor and (2) the
address of the caller, msg.sender, is not directly used
in a comparison. This heuristic can give false positives
and false negatives, but our experience shows that it is
effective in practice.
• Data dependency analysis Slither computes the data
dependencies of all variables as a pre-stage using the SSA
representation. The dependencies are first analyzed in the
context of each function. Then a fixpoint is computed
across all the functions of the contract, to determine
whether there is a dependency in a multi-transaction
context. Slither classifies some variables as tainted, which
means that the variable is dependent on a user-controlled
variable, and, therefore, can be influenced by the user.
Finally, the data dependency takes into account the
protected function heuristic. As a result, it is possible
to select dependencies according to the user’s privilege
level. This granular information about data dependency
is essential to writing accurate vulnerability detectors.
B. Automated Vulnerability Detection
The open source version of Slither contains more than
twenty bug detectors, including:
• Shadowing: Solidity enables the shadowing of most of
the contract’s elements, such as local and state variables,
functions, or events. Shadowed elements may not refer
to the objects expected by the contract author.
• Uninitialized variables: Uninitialized state or local vari-
ables are a common source of errors in programming
languages.
• Reentrancy: The reentrancy vulnerability (see Sec-
tion V-A3) is well known.
• A variety of other known security issues, such as suicidal
contracts, locked ether, or arbitrary sending of ether [15].
Closed-source detectors extend Slither’s capabilities to de-
tect more advanced bugs, such as race conditions, unprotected
privileged functions, or incorrect token manipulations.
C. Automated Optimization Detection
Slither can detect code patterns that lead to costly code
execution and deployment, a topic of considerable interest for
smart contracts where there is a clear financial cost associated
with inefficient code [5]. The framework includes detectors
for:
• Variables that should be declared as constants. Constant
variables are optimized by the compiler1 , consume less
gas, and do not take space in storage.
• Functions that should be declared as externals. External
functions allow the compiler to optimize the code2.
D. Code Understanding
Slither includes printers, which allow users to quickly
understand what a contract does and how it is structured. Open
source printers include:
• The exportation of different graph-based representations,
including the inheritance graph, the control flow graph,
and the call graph of each contract.
• A human-readable summary of the contracts, including
the number of issues found and information about the
code quality, such as cyclomatic complexity, or a minting
restriction for ERC20 tokens.
• A summary of the authorization accesses and the vari-
ables that can be changed by the contract’s owner.
E. Assisted Code Review
Users can build third-party scripts and tools using Slither
Python API3. A custom script can target contract-specific
1https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.5.2/contracts.html#
constant-state-variables
2https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.5.2/contracts.html#
visibility-and-getters
3https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/API-examples
needs. For example, a user can ensure that a specific variable
is never tainted by the parameter of a given function, or
that a function is reachable only via legitimate entry points.
Third-party tools can use Slither internals to build more
advanced analyses, such as symbolic execution on top of
SlithIR, or a conversion from SlithIR to another intermediate
representation, such as LLVM.
F. Implementation
Slither is implemented in 16K lines of Python 3 code and is
available on GitHub4. It has support for continuous integration
and developer toolboxes (such as Truffle and Remix). It has
minimal dependencies and only relies on a recent version of
the Solidity compiler to parse the AST of the contract under
analysis.
IV. SLITHIR
SlithIR is the hybrid intermediate representation used in
Slither to represent Solidity code. Each node of the control
flow graph can contain up to a single Solidity expression,
which is converted to a set of SlithIR instructions. This repre-
sentation makes implementing analyses easier, without losing
the critical semantic information contained in the Solidity
source code.
A. Instruction Set
SlithIR uses fewer than 40 instructions. It has no internal
control flow representation and relies on Slither’s control-flow
graph structure (SlithIR code is associated with each node
in the graph). The following gives a high-level description
of some notable instructions; the complete descriptions is
available at [26].
1) Notation: LV and RV respectively represent a variable
that is assigned (left-value) and a variable that is read (right-
value). A variable can be a Solidity variable or a temporary
variable created by the intermediate representation.
2) Arithmetic Operations: are represented as either a Bi-
nary or Unary operator:
• LV = RV BINARY RV
• LV = UNARY RV
3) Mappings and Arrays:: Solidity allows the manipulation
of mappings and arrays that are accessed through derefer-
encing. SlithIR uses a specific variable type, called REF
(ReferenceVariable) to store the result of a dereferencing. The
index operator allows dereferencing of a variable:
• REF ← Variable [Index]
4) Structures:: Access to a structure is done through the
member operator:
• REF ← Variable · Member
4https://github.com/crytic/slither
using SafeMath for uint;
mapping(address => uint) balances;
function transfer(address to, uint val) public{
balances[msg.sender] = balances[msg.sender].min(
val);
balances[to] = balances[to].add(val);
}
Fig. 2: Solidity code example
Funct ion t r a n s f e r ( address , uint256 )
S o l i d i t y : b a l a n c e s [ msg . sender ] = b a l a n c e s [ msg . sender ] . sub
( v a l )
S l i t h I R :
REF 0 ( uint256 ) −> b a l a n c e s [ msg . sender ]
REF 1 ( uint256 ) −> b a l a n c e s [ msg . sender ]
TMP 1( uint256 ) = LIB CALL SafeMath . sub ( REF 1 , v a l )
REF 0 := TMP 1( uint256 ) // dereferencing
S o l i d i t y : b a l a n c e s [ t o ] = b a l a n c e s [ t o ] . add ( v a l )
S l i t h I R :
REF 3 ( uint256 ) −> b a l a n c e s [ t o ]
REF 4 ( uint256 ) −> b a l a n c e s [ t o ]
TMP 3( uint256 ) = LIB CALL , d e s t : SafeMath . add ( REF 4 , v a l
)
REF 3 := TMP 3( uint256 ) // dereferencing
Fig. 3: SlithIR code for Figure 2
5) Calls:: Slither gives in-depth information about calls and
possesses nine call instructions:
• LV = L_CALL Destination Function
[ARG..] (low-level Solidity call)
• LV = H_CALL Destination Function
[ARG..] (high-level Solidity call)
• LV = LIB_CALL Destination Function
[ARG..] (library call)
• LV = S_CALL Function [ARG..] (call to a
inbuilt-Solidity function)
• LV = I_CALL Function [ARG..] (call to an in-
ternal function)
• LV = DYN_CALL Variable [ARG..] (call to an
internal dynamic function)
• LV = E_CALL Event [ARG..] (event call)
• LV = Send Destination (Solidity send)
• Transfer Destination (Solidity transfer)
Some calls can have additional arguments, for example,
H_CALL, L_CALL, Send and Transfer can have V alue as-
sociated to the call, representing the amount of ether for the
transaction.
6) Additional Instructions: include PUSH for array ma-
nipulation, CONVERT for type conversion, and operators to
manipulate tuples.
7) Example: Figure 3 is the SlithIR representation of the
code showed in Figure 2.
B. SSA
Static Single Assignment form [19] (SSA) is a represen-
tation commonly used in compilation and static analysis in
general. It requires that each variable is assigned only one time
and defined prior to its usage; e.g., x = 3; y = x++; x
struct MyStructure {
uint val;
}
MyStructure private a;
MyStructure private b;
function increase(bool useb) external {
MyStructure storage ref = a;
if(useb){
ref = b;
}
ref.val += 1;
}
Fig. 4: Smart contract using storage references
= y + x becomes x1 = 3; y1 = x1; x2 = x1 + 1;
x3 = y1 + x2. One of the main advantages of SSA is to
allow def-use chains to be easily computed, making data-
dependency analyses straightforward. Using SSA form also
enables more aggressive future analyses. For example, because
gas limits force a bound on computational cost of contract
execution, bounded model checking [1] using SAT/SMT is a
natural fit for contract analysis. SlithIR’s SSA representation
plus graph-based control flow is very similar to the represen-
tation used in the successful CBMC [12] tool for C.
Slither stores two SlithIR versions: with and without SSA.
1) State Variables: A so-called φ function on a node
indicates that a variable has multiple potential definitions and
is a key element of SSA form [19]. One particularity of smart
contracts is to heavily rely on state variables, which act as
global variables. At the beginning of a function, the value
of a state variable can be its initial value, or the value after
the execution of any function. Additionally, an external call
may re-enter, which can allow a state variable to change. As
a result, a φ function is placed at the entry of each function,
and after the external calls, for each state variable read by the
function.
2) Alias Analysis: Solidity allows local variables to refer to
state variables, as shown in Figure 4. Such variables are called
storage references. A write operation to a local variable can,
therefore, refer to a write to multiple state variables. Slither
computes an alias analysis to find all the possible targets of
the storage reference and gives the information to the SSA
engine. As a result, φ functions can be correctly placed after
the write to a storage reference. In the example in Figure 4, two
φ functions will be placed at the expression ref.val+ = 1; to
indicate that a and b are updated.
C. Comparison to Other Smart Contract Intermediate Repre-
sentations and Discussion
Other intermediate representations for smart contracts have
been proposed. Scilla [29] is the intermediate representation
used by the Zilliqa blockchain. It is based on the notion of
communicating automata and contains a translation to the Coq
proof assistant to prove safety and liveness properties. While
Scilla is a promising representation, and it does possess a
translation from Solidity code, it is not clear if it would be
able to represent the entire Solidity language or only a subset.
Michelson [23] is the intermediate representation used in the
Tezos blockchain. It is a stack-based representation, making
it less suitable for static analysis than SlithIR. IELE [11]
is the representation developed for the Cardano blockchain.
IELE is modeled in the K framework, and can take advantage
of K existing analyses. IELE works at a lower-level than
SlithIR and is, therefore, complementary to it. For example,
in IELE, state variables are represented through stores and
reads to the storage memory rather than variables, which
makes their analysis more complicated, while it allows a more
accurate gas estimation. The Solidity authors are working on
an intermediate representation called YUL [21], which is still
a work in progress at the time of writing. While adding an
intermediate representation within the Solidity compiler is a
good step towards a safer language, YUL does not provide the
same level of information as does SlithIR. For example, YUL
does not possess an SSA representation, and is written as a
list of nested expressions, making the construction of static
analyses less straightforward.
SlithIR possesses some remaining limitations and has room
for improvement. The principal omission is the lack of for-
mal semantics, which would allow more rigorous analyses.
Another limitation is that the representation is too high-level
to accurately reflect low-level information, such as the gas
computation.
V. EVALUATION AND COMPARISON TO
STATE-OF-THE-ART TOOLS
We performed an evaluation of three aspects of Slither: (1)
vulnerability detection, (2) missing optimization detection, and
(3) source-code exploration. Slither and the other state-of-the-
art tools are evaluated using real-world contracts. Most of the
state-of-the-art tools are focused on the detection of security
issues, and therefore, (1) is the core focus of our evaluation.
A. Vulnerability Detection Evaluation
We compare Slither (release 0.5.0) with other open-source
static analysis tools to detect vulnerabilities in Ethereum smart
contracts: Securify (revision 37e2984), SmartCheck (revi-
sion 4d3367a) and Solhint (release 1.1.10). We decided to
focus our evaluation exclusively on tools’ reentrancy detectors,
since reentrancy is one of the oldest, most well understood,
and most dangerous security issues. This detector is available
in all the tools we evaluated.
We do not consider tools based on dynamic analysis, such
as Manticore, Oyente or Mythril, as they are known to have
scalability issues and do not compete directly with static
analysis tools.
1) Experiments: We evaluate the static analysis tools using
two experiments: in the first, we used two famous contracts
vulnerable to reentrancy, DAO[16] and SpankChain[22], to
verify if the tools can rediscover the issues actually exploited.
In the second experiment, we used the 1000 most used
contracts (those with the largest number of transactions),
mapping ( address => u i n t ) b a l a n c e s ;
f u n c t i o n wi thd rawBa la nce ( ) p u b l i c {
i f ( ! ( msg . sender . c a l l . va lue ( b a l a n c e s [ msg .
sender ] ) ( ) ) ) {
throw ;
}
b a l a n c e s [ msg . sender ] = 0 ;
}
Fig. 5: Reentrancy example
for which Etherscan [28] provides the source code. Several
other evaluations in the literature [14], [15], [20] use a direct
sample of contracts in the blockchain instead. However, we
found that such a selection is biased in an unhelpful way, as
most of the contracts deployed on Ethereum are essentially
tests, lacking the complexity (and code quality) that widely
used contracts have. As a result, most of these contracts
are likely to contain trivial-to-detect bugs not reflecting real-
world situations, which can skew results. A previous effort
to compare Solidity analysis tools (both static and dynamic)
proposed even more selective choice of contracts, based on
Zeppelin audits, but this resulted in a set of only 28 contracts
to analyze [8]; we were able to use a larger set by restricting
the scope of comparison, rather than the contracts selected.
2) Metrics: The tools are evaluated on three metrics: per-
formance, robustness, and accuracy. The performance metric
indicates how fast a tool runs on each contract. It should
include every step needed to analyze a smart contract. If a
tool requires a contract to be compiled, the compilation time
is included in this metric. The robustness metric indicates how
often each tool fails to parse, decompile, or analyze a smart
contract. Finally, the accuracy metric measures both number
of contracts flagged and number of false positives detected.
3) Reentrancy Revisited: A function in a smart contract is
said to be reentrant if it contains a call to an external contract
that can be used to re-enter the function itself. A reentrancy
can lead to a variety of exploitations, including loss of ether,
when a state variable is changed only after an external call.
This issue became famous during the DAO hack [16] and
SpankChain[22].
Figure 5 shows a classic example of reentrancy. The ex-
ploitability of reentrancy issues is very well known, most
vulnerability detection tools for Ethereum smart contracts
issue a warning when they detect code like that in Figure 5.
Reentrancy patterns are not uncommon, but in most of cases,
the reentrancy is not severe for two reasons:
• It requires special privileges: only the owner can act
maliciously.
• It is benign: the ”exploit” has the same effect as two
successive calls.
During our evaluation, if a tool flags a benign reentrancy in
a contract, it is considered a false positive.
4) Experiment 1: The last two columns of Table I show
whether the DAO and SpankChain vulnerabilities were found
by each tool. It is worth noting that several reentrancies are
reported by the tools in both examples. However, we consider
the result valid only if the tool can detect the actual reentrancy
that was used during the exploitation of the contract. Slither
is the only tool capable of finding these two real-world cases
of reentrancy.
5) Experiment 2: For the second experiment, using a
dataset of 1000 contracts, the tools were run on each contract
with a timeout of 120 seconds, using only reentrancy detectors.
We manually disabled other detection rules to avoid the
introduction of bias in the measurements.
• Performance: The Average execution time and Timed-
out analyses rows in Table I summarize performance
results: Slither is the fastest tool, followed by Solhint,
SmartCheck, and Securify. In our experiments, Slither
was typically as fast as a simple linter.
• Robustness: The Failed analyses row in Table I summa-
rizes robustness results: Slither is the most robust tool,
followed by Solhint, SmartCheck, and Securify. Slither
failed only for 0.1% of the contracts, while Solhint
failed for around 1.2%. SmartCheck and Securify are
less robust, failing 10.22% and 11.20% of the time,
respectively.
• Accuracy: The False positives, Flagged contracts and
Detections per contract rows in Table I summarizes
accuracy results.
Due to time constraints, we manually reviewed a random
sample of at least 50 of the flagged contracts for each
tool, rather than all potentially benign reentrancies.
Our experiments show that Slither is the most accurate
tool, with the lowest false positive rate: 10.9%, followed
by Securify with 25%. SmartCheck and Solhint have high
false positive rates of 73.6% and 91.3% respectively.
Additionally, we include the number of contracts for
which at least one reentrancy is detected (flagged con-
tracts) and the number of findings on average per flagged
contract. On one hand, SmartCheck flags a large number
of contracts, confirming its high false positive rate. On
the other hand, Securify flags a very small number of
contracts, which indicates that the tool fails to find a
number of true positives found by other tools.
6) Discussion: In these experiments, Slither outperforms
the other analyzers for detecting reentrancy by detecting real-
world bugs while maintaining a low false positive rate. How-
ever, we should note that our experiments are limited in many
ways. The false positives rate for Securify is based on a very
low number of findings (8). Additionally, several contracts in
our dataset share fragments of code, creating a bias in the
results. For instance, the false positives from Slither result
from only a few distinct functions that are duplicated across
multiple contracts. Despite these limitations, the experiment
shows that Slither is more accurate and mature than the other
tools.
We also found that SmartCheck and Solhint have a large
number of false positives due to a lack of in-depth understand-
ing of Solidity. For example, the Solidity attribute super, which
Slither Securify SmartCheck Solhint
Accuracy
False positives 10.9% 25% 73.6% 91.3%
Flagged contracts 112 8 793 81
Detections per contract 3.17 2.12 10.22 2.16
Performance Average execution time 0.79± 1 41.4± 46.3 10.9± 7.14 0.95± 0.35Timed out analyses 0% 20.4% 4% 0%
Robustness Failed analyses 0.1% 11.2% 10.22% 1.2%
Reentrancy examples DAO X 7 X 7Spankchain X 7 7 7
TABLE I: Summary of the evaluation results
allows calling an inherited function, is taken as an external call
by these tools.
B. Optimization Detection Evaluation
To test the optimization capacity of Slither, we select the
detector finding variables that should have been declared as
constants. If a variable is declared constant, it will not take
space in the storage of the contract, and will require fewer
instructions when used. As a result, using constant variables
when possible reduces the code size (and thus the cost to
deploy the contracts), as well as the usage cost. To the best
of our knowledge, Slither is the only available tool capable of
finding this code optimization.
We applied the detector on two datasets: (1) the 1000
contracts selected for experiment 2 (Section V-A), and (2)
35.000 contracts from [28]. We found that 54% of the
contracts from (1) and 56% from (2) contain one or more
variables that could have been declared as constant. Some of
these variables are never accessed and could have been entirely
removed.
This result shows that Slither can efficiently be used to
detect practical code optimization.
C. Code Understanding Comparison
Slither printers provide a variety of visual outputs to
improve code understanding. The closest tool that provides
similar features is Surya5. Surya parses the contract AST and
offers a set of outputs. It only performs a syntactic analysis
and does not provide any semantic analysis.
Table II shows a comparison of Slither printers with Surya
features. Both tools provide similar features, except than Surya
outputs a textual representation of the AST and the function
call trace, while Slither yields information about variables read
and written. Both tools can generate a report, but they differ in
their contents. Surya shows contracts and functions name, as
well as the mutability and modifiers calls, while Slither shows
the number of bugs found, the code complexity (based on
cyclomatic complexity), and provides high-level information
for specific context based on a set of heuristics (such as the
minting limitation in case of ERC20 tokens).
Slither includes the information provided by Surya, but can
integrate more advanced information, as it has an in-depth
understanding of the codebase.
5https://github.com/ConsenSys/surya
D. Threats to Validity
The most important threat to validity is that our primary
experiment is limited to reentrancy detection over a limited set
of contracts. The measure we used to determine a meaningful
set of contracts (number of transactions) is reasonable [3], but
not standardized by the community. It was unclear how to use
some very recently proposed frameworks for smart contract
analysis, e.g. SmartAnvil [9], which were thus omitted from
our experiments.
In order to make our results reproducible, and allow check-
ing of our code and analysis methods, we have made our
experimental setup available6.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We presented Slither, an open source static analysis frame-
work for smart contracts. Slither is fast, robust, accurate,
and provides rich information about smart contracts. Our
framework leverages SlithIR, an intermediate representation
designed for practical static analysis on Solidity code. Slither
is the only platform that can be used at the same time to find
bugs, suggest code optimizations, increase code understanding
for a given contract. It was built to be easily extended,
and serve as a basis upon which third-party tools can be
implemented.
We evaluated the bug finding capacity of Slither by compar-
ing its performance on reentrancy bugs against other available
state-of-the-art tools. We found that Slither outperforms the
other tools in terms of performance, robustness, and accuracy.
There are several directions that we could take to improve
Slither. As the tool is daily used during audits, a first improve-
ment is the integration of new issue detectors. Optimization
could be applied to SlithIR to generate more efficient code.
Symbolic execution or bounded model checking could be
built on top of our intermediate representation, allowing easy
access to formal verification for bug detectors, and loop-
bound based worst-case gas cost analyses. The Slither analyzer
was originally designed to target Solidity code, but both the
platform and the intermediate representation can be adapted
for another smart contract language, such as Vyper. Finally, a
translation from SlithIR to EVM or Ewasm bytecode would
allow Slither to serve as a compiler.
6https://gist.github.com/ggrieco-tob/748bca8a0d166e026ea717e225a4fbf9
Slither Surya
Contract Summary contract-summary describe
Functions Summary function-summary
Inheritance dependencies inheritance dependencies
Inheritance graph inheritance-graph inheritance
Call graph call-graph graph
AST parse
Functions call trace ftrace
Authorization and access summary vars-and-auth
Report human-summary mdreport
TABLE II: Comparison of Slither printers with Surya
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